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Nondelegation Canons
Cass R. Sunsteint
Reports of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated. Rather
than having been abandoned, the doctrine has merely been renamed and relocated Its current
home consists of a set of nondelegationcanons which forbid executive agenciesfrom making certain decisions on their own. These canonsforbid extraterritorialapplicationof national law, intrusions on state sovereignty, decisions harmful to Native AmericanS and absolutist approaches to
health and safety. The nondelegation canons arefar preferable to the old nondelegation doctrine,
because they are subject to principledjudicial application,and because they do not threaten to unsettle so much of modern government.

It is often said that the nondelegation doctrine is dead. According to the familiar refrain,' the doctrine was once used to require Congress to legislate with some clarity, so as to ensure that law is made by
the national legislature rather than by the executive. But the nondelegation doctrine-the refrain continues-is now merely a bit of rhetoric, as the United States Code has become littered with provisions
asking one or another administrative agency to do whatever it thinks
best.3 While this is an overstatement, it captures an important truth:
Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not struck down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds, notwithstanding the existence of a
number of plausible occasions.'
But is the nondelegation doctrine really dead? On the contrary, I
believe that the doctrine is alive and well. It has been relocated rather
f Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Jill Hasday, Richard Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a previous draft.
I
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory of Judicial Review 132-33 (Harvard 1980).
2
See id at 131-33.
3 See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility:How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation58-81 (Yale 1993).
4 See Part I below for a brief overview.
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than abandoned. Federal courts commonly vindicate not a general
nondelegation doctrine, but a series of more specific and smaller,
though quite important, nondelegation doctrines. Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, courts hold that
federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities
unless and until Congress has expressly authorized them to do so. The
relevant choices must be made legislatively rather than bureaucratically. As a technical matter, the key holdings are based not on the
nondelegation doctrine but on certain "canons" of construction.
What I mean to identify here are the nondelegation canons, not
organized or recognized as such, but central to the operation of modem public law. These are nondelegation canons for the simple reason
that they forbid administrative agencies from making decisions on
their own.' Consider a few examples. Congress must affirmatively
authorize the extraterritorial application of federal law;6 agencies cannot exercise their ordinary discretion, under an ambiguous statutory
provision, so as to apply national law outside of American borders. A
clear congressional statement to this effect is required. Administrative
agencies are not permitted to construe federal statutes in such a way
as to raise serious constitutional questions; if the constitutional question is substantial, Congress must clearly assert its desire to venture
into the disputed terrain. When treaties and statutes are ambiguous,
they must be construed favorably to Native American tribes; the
agency's own judgment, if it is an exercise of discretion, is irrelevant."
As we will see, there are many more examples, including a recent
canon forbidding agencies to impose high costs for trivial gains.9
In this Article I have two purposes, descriptive and normative.
The descriptive purpose is to show how certain canons of construction
operate as nondelegation principles. My aim is to unify a set of seemingly disparate cases that rely on these canons, and to suggest that

5 Some canons are described as "clear statement" principles, so labeled because they require a clear statement from Congress. See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation282-83 (Harvard 1994). The nondelegation canons are all clear statement
principles, but many clear statement principles are not nondelegation canons, because they do
not involve agencies at all. See note 116 and accompanying text.
6 See, for example, EEOC v ArabianAmerican Oil Co, 499 US 244,248 (1991) (noting the
presumption that congressional legislation primarily concerns domestic matters).
7 See, for example, Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital,488 US 204, 208-09 (1988)
(stating that a congressional delegation of authority will be understood as granting the power to
make retroactive rules only if the Congress specifically said so).
8 See, for example, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v Hodel, 851 F2d 1439, 1444-45 (DC Cir

1988) (stating that "canons of construction applicable in Indian law" require that "[s]tatutes are
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit").
9 See note 93 and accompanying text.
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they actually constitute a coherent and flourishing doctrine, amounting to the contemporary nondelegation doctrine.
The second and normative purpose is to show that such canons,
though highly controversial, should be understood as entirely legitimate. The nondelegation canons have crucial advantages over the
more familiar nondelegation doctrine insofar as they are easily administrable, pose a less severe strain on judicial capacities, and risk far
less in the way of substantive harm. The nondelegation canons represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior
democratic pedigree. '° Indeed, the nondelegation canons turn out to
be a contemporary incarnation of the founding effort to link protection of individual rights, and other important interests, with appropriate institutional design." In certain cases, Congress must decide the
key questions on its own. This is the enduring function of the nondelegation doctrine, and it is endorsed, not repudiated, by current law.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL DOCTRINE: DIFFICULTIES AND DOUBTS
To understand the nondelegation canons, it is necessary first to
explore the conventional nondelegation doctrine.'2 In exploring that
doctrine, my purpose is not to reach a final verdict about its appropriate place in constitutional law. I attempt more narrowly to show, first,
the undeniable appeal of the doctrine and, second, the large risks that
would be raised by any judicial attempt at a large-scale revival. In
showing its appeal, I mean to link the purposes of the conventional
doctrine with those of the nondelegation canons-to pave the way for
the latter by identifying the goals of the former. And in showing the
risks that the conventional doctrine would pose, I mean to show how
the nondelegation canons are in many ways a superior alternative.
My basic conclusion is that it is extremely difficult to defend the
idea that courts should understand Article I, section I of the Constitution to require Congress to legislate with particularity." The most convincing claim on behalf of the conventional doctrine is far narrower
and more modest: that certain highly sensitive decisions should be
made by Congress, and not by the executive pursuant to open-ended
10 On minimalism and democracy-forcing minimalism generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, One
Caseat a 7ime: JudicialMinimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard 1999).
11 See Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: DeliberativeDemocracy and American National Government 6-28 (Chicago 1994) (discussing features of the Constitution aimed at
avoiding problems of pre-constitutional legislatures).
12 There is an overlapping discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 Mich L Rev 303,330-39 (1999); some of the points made there are treated in more detail here, and vice versa.
13 US Const Art I,
§1.
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legislative instructions. My general purpose is to suggest that even
those who are most skeptical of the conventional doctrine should be

willing to embrace the nondelegation canons as a highly desirable alternative-and also to show how those who embrace (as I would not)
the conventional doctrine should also embrace the nondelegation
canons as deserving a large role even if the conventional doctrine
were to be revived." Those who reject and those who support the con-

ventional doctrine might well be brought into agreement on the value
and the legitimacy of the nondelegation canons.
A. Intelligible Principles (?)
As the Supreme Court has long said, the conventional doctrine6
requires Congress to supply something like an "intelligible principle'
to guide and limit executive discretion. 7 According to its supporters,
the nondelegation doctrine was a central part of the original constitutional plan, but fell into disuse in the aftermath of the New Deal. Indeed it is true that the Court referred to the nondelegation principle
on a number of occasions in the pre-New Deal period. 8Moreover, the
Court invoked the doctrine to invalidate two acts of Congress in 1935,
most famously in the Schechter Poultry case. 9 There the Court struck

down a quite open-ended grant of authority to develop "codes of fair
competition"; a particular problem with the underlying statute was
that it combined a high degree of vagueness with a grant of power, in
practice, to private groups to develop such codes as they chose.2 But it
is also true that the Court has not used the doctrine to invalidate any

statute since that time, notwithstanding many occasions when it might

14
For support, see Ernest Gellhorn and Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-BasedDelegations, 20 Cardozo L Rev 989,992-94 (1999) (arguing against deference to agency interpretations
of jurisdictional provisions).
15 This is therefore an occasion where an incompletely theorized agreement might be generated in support of an otherwise puzzling line of doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and PoliticalConflict (Oxford 1996).
16
The specific term is used and discussed in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v Connally, 337 F
Supp 737,745-47 (D DC 1971).
17
The Brig Aurora, 11 US (7 Cranch) 382,387-88 (1813) (recognizing the nondelegation
principle but upholding a disputed legislative Act because it was a revival of a legislative Act and
not merely a Presidential proclamation); Fieldv Clark, 143 US 649, 692 (1892) (noting the "universally recognized" principle that "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President"); United States v Grimaud,220US 506,521 (1911) (quoting Field);J.W.Hampton,Jr., & Co
v United States, 276 US 394,406-07 (1928) (collecting cases discussing delegation).
18 See Field,143 US at 692-93; The BrigAurora, 11 US at 388; Grimaud,220 US at 510.
19 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v US, 295 US 495 (1935). The only other decision invalidating agency action on nondelegation grounds is Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388
(1935).
20
Schechter Poultry, 295 US at 537. For general discussion of Schechter Poultry, see Sunstein, 98 Mich L Rev at 332-33 (cited in note 12).
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have found an absence of the requisite "intelligible principle. 2 1 Focusing on what they see as a plain breach of constitutional requirements, many observers have argued on behalf of a large-scale revival
of the nondelegation doctrine in its conventional form.2 The nondelegation canons can be best understood against the background set by
these arguments.
For those who are committed to the conventional doctrine, there
are a number of underlying concerns. Perhaps the most basic are textual and historical. The unambiguous textual grant of lawmaking
power to Congress 4 might well be taken to mean that Congress, and
no one else, has lawmaking authority; a delegation of "legislative"
power anyone else might seem inconsistent with the constitutional
plan. In addition, the conceptual background of the system of checks
and balances seems to provide historical support for this view, suggesting, on Lockean grounds, that the original understanding would
have condemned open-ended grants of power to the executive. Even
if there is no direct support in the founding era for the view that delegations are prohibited (a point to which I will return), the principle of
nondelegation might seem such an inevitable implication of the division of powers that it went without saying.
To the textual and historical points, enthusiasts for the conventional doctrine are able to add a series of claims about constitutional
purpose and structure. The most important involves political accountability,2 and in particular that form of accountability that comes from
the distinctive composition of Congress and the system of bicameralism. In light of the particular design of the central lawmaking institution, any delegation threatens to eliminate the special kind of accountability embodied in that institution (not incidentally including, in
the Senate, the representation of states as such). It is worth underlin21
See Mistretta v US, 488 US 361 (1989); US v Southwestern Cable Co, 392 US 157 (1968);
Lichter v US, 334 US 742 (1948); Yakus v US, 321 US 414 (1944). The development of the doc-

trine over time is outlined in Sunstein, 98 Mich L Rev at 330-35 (cited in note 12).
22 See, for example, Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (cited in note 3); Ernest
Gellhorn, Returning to FirstPrinciples,36 Am U L Rev 345,347-49 (1987); Theodore J. Lowi,
7wo Roads to Serfdom" Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 Am U L Rev

295,303-04 (1987).
23 See Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 180 (cited in note 3); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev 1231,1240-41 (1994); Ely, Democ-

racy and Distrust at 132 (cited in note 1); Gellhorn, 36 Am U L Rev at 347-48 (cited in note 22);
Lowi, 36 Am U L Rev at 303-04 (cited in note 22). A helpful symposium is The Phoenix Rises
Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutionaland Policy Perspectives,20 Cardozo L
Rev 731 (1999), as is A Symposium on Administrative Law, "The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of

the Administrative Agencies", 36 Am U L Rev 277 (1987).
24 US Const Art I, § 1.
25 Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v API, 448 US 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist
concurring).
26
See in particular Ely,Democracy and Distrustat 77-78 (cited in note 1).
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ing the role of bicameralism here. The evident obstacles to the enactment of federal law-a point of great relevance to the nondelegation
canons-might be overcome if Congress could ask another institution,
not subject to those obstacles, to enact law as it chooses.
This point is closely related to another. Simply by virtue of requiring legislators to agree on a relatively specific form of words, the
nondelegation principle seems to raise the burdens and costs associated with the enactment of federal law.n On one view, those burdens
and costs are an important guarantor of individual liberty, because
they ensure that national governmental power may not be brought to
bear against individuals without a consensus, established by legislative
agreement on relatively specific words, that this step is desirable. To
those who believe that the original institutional design was founded
partly on the belief that the central government was a potential threat
to freedom, open-ended delegations might seem to be a core violation
of constitutional commitments.n
In various ways, the nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule of
law values. Indeed, the ban on delegations appears to be closely connected to the void for vagueness doctrine, requiring that certain laws
be clear rather than open-ended. The two key purposes of the latter
doctrine are to provide fair notice to affected citizens and also to discipline the enforcement discretion of unelected administrators and
bureaucrats.3 By ensuring that those asked to implement the law be
bound by intelligible principles, the nondelegation doctrine serves the
same purposes. Quite apart from promoting accountability, the conventional doctrine thus seems to promote goals typically associated
with the rule of law.
Finally, the requirement of legislative clarity might also seem to
be a check on the problems of factional power and self-interested rep27 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (unpublished manuscript Feb
2000) (emphasizing the tendency of groups to go in extreme directions and the role of bicameralism as a check on insufficiently considered extreme movements).
28 Some questions emerge about this conventional view from David Epstein and Sharyn
O'Halloran, DelegatingPowers: A Transactions Cost PoliticsApproach to Policy Making Under

SeparatePowers237-39 (Cambridge 1999); the analysis there emphasizes the role of committtees
in fashioning specific terms when delegation is unavailable.
29 The Nazi experience might provide an instructive lesson here. One of the earlier decisions by the German legislature, under Hitler, was to authorize Hitler to rule "by decree," and
the resulting experience helped inspire an explicit nondelegation principle in the German Constitution. See David R Currie, The Constitutionof the FederalRepublic of Germany 125-26 (Chi-

cago 1994). See also German Const Art 80, § 1,requiring that the content, purpose, and extent of
the legislative authorization be specified in the statute itselt Note also that the Constitutional
Court of South Africa has embarked on enforcement of a nondelegation principle, at least in extreme cases. See Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v Presidentof the Republic South
Africa 1995 (4) SA 877,898-906,918-19 (Const Ct).
30 See Papachristouv City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 162-65 (1971); City of Chicago v

Morales,119 S Ct 1849,1859 (1999) (gang loitering case).
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resentation, two of the problems most feared by the framers." Indeed,
the nondelegation doctrine might be taken as a central means of reducing the risk that legislation will be a product of efforts by wellorganized private groups to redistribute wealth or opportunities in
their favor.3 The institutional design of Congress was intended to limit
the power of well-organized private groups over government, and the
requirement of general approval, from various legislators, seems to
reduce the risk that self-interested representatives, with narrow agendas of their own, would use the lawmaking process to promote their
parochial interests. These points might be summarized by linking the
nondelegation principle with the general constitutional goal of providing a deliberative democracy. 3
B.

Problems, Institutional and Otherwise

These arguments are not entirely without force; but as arguments
for a large-scale revival of the conventional doctrine, they are quite
vulnerable. The most serious problems are two-fold. First, judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would raise serious problems
of judicial competence and would greatly magnify the role of the judiciary in overseeing the operation of modem government. Because the
relevant questions are ones of degree, the nondelegation doctrine
could not be administered in anything like a rule-bound way, and
hence the nondelegation doctrine is likely, in practice, to violate its
own aspirations to discretion-free law." Second, it is far from clear that
a large-scale judicial revival of the nondelegation doctrine would do
anything to improve the operation of the regulatory state. It may well
make things worse, possibly much worse.
As we will see, the nondelegation canons do not face these problems. For this reason the canons appear to be a promising alternative.
For those who are not convinced by these objections, and who believe
31 James Madison referred to both but spoke of the former as the more serious danger:
"[Iln our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of
private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of government contrary to the sense of
its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major

number of the constituents." Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct 17,1788), in R. Rutland and
C Hobson, eds, 11 The Papersof James Madison 298 (1977). This point bears on the defense of
the nondelegation canons as requirements of clear legislative authorization for certain actions, as
we will see.
32 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation,68 Cornell L Rev 1, 63-67 (1982) (emphasizing the role of rent seeking in the legisla-

tive process and the risk that delegations will increase rent-seeking legislation).
33 See Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason at 6-39 (cited in note 11).
34

See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond DelegationDoctrine,36 Am U L Rev 323,324-28 (1987)

(discussing "the absence of judicially manageable and enforceable criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations"); Mistretta, 488 US at 415-16 (Scalia dissenting) (emphasizing problems with judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine).
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that the conventional doctrine is nonetheless desirable, the nondelegation canons should be seen as a valuable complement, and as a noteworthy area of modem public law where a version of the doctrine still
flourishes.
1. Questions about pedigree.
Does the conventional doctrine really have a solid constitutional
pedigree? It turns out that this question does not have a simple affirmative answer, from the standpoint of judicial practice, text, or history.
It is true that the Supreme Court last invalidated a statute on
nondelegation grounds in 1935. But it is also true the Court first invalidated a statute on nondelegation grounds in exactly the same year,
notwithstanding a number of previous opportunities. ' It is therefore
misleading to suggest that the nondelegation doctrine was a wellentrenched aspect of constitutional doctrine, suddenly abandoned as
part of some post-New Deal capitulation to the emerging administrative state. Indeed, it is more accurate, speaking purely descriptively, to
see 1935 as the real anomaly. We might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).
Nor do text and history provide unambiguous support for the
conventional doctrine. The Constitution does grant legislative power
to Congress, but it does not in terms forbid delegations of that power,36
and I have been unable to find any indication, in the founding era, that
such delegations were originally thought to be banned. Perhaps silence on the point can be taken to show that the ban on delegations
was so obvious that it need not have been discussed. But the practice
of early congresses strongly suggests that broad grants of authority to
the executive were not thought to be problematic. The first Congress
granted military pensions, not pursuant to legislative guidelines, but
"under such regulations as the President of the United States may direct."37 The second Congress gave the President the authority to grant
licenses to trade with the Indian tribes, not with limitations, but under
"such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe."' There
appears to be no evidence, in these or other cases, that members of
Congress thought that such grants of authority violated a general
nondelegation principle, notwithstanding extensive discussion of con-

35

See note 17.

36

Compare the German Constitution, which does precisely that. See note 29.
1 Stat 95 (1789).
1 Stat 137 (1790).

37

38
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stitutional requirements within Congress in the early years of the nation."
These points do not demonstrate that the conventional nondelegation doctrine has no foundation in the original document. On the
contrary, the best inference from Article I, Section 1 is that some sort
of nondelegation doctrine does have constitutional status. But the text
and history must be counted ambiguous rather than plain on the
point, and the fact of ambiguity raises questions about any large-scale
judicial enforcement of a nondelegation principle.
2. Questions about structure, liberty, and welfare.
Nor can the structural and purposive arguments be taken as conclusive. With respect to the conventional doctrine, democratic considerations are highly ambiguous.40 Agencies are themselves democratically accountable via the President, and any delegation must itself be
an exercise of lawmaking authority, operating pursuant to the constitutional requirements for the making of federal law. Congress may
face electoral pressure merely by virtue of delegating broad authority
to the executive; this is a perfectly legitimate issue to raise in an election, and "passing the buck" to bureaucrats is unlikely, in most circumstances, to be the most popular electoral strategy. If Congress has
delegated such authority, perhaps that is what voters want.
To be sure, these points are not decisive. Congress has a distinctive form of accountability, through the mechanisms for representation and the system of bicameralism, and it is that form of accountability, not accountability in the abstract, that justifies a nondelegation
doctrine. But the democratic case for sharp limits on agency discretion
is far from clear-cut. In fact, congressional specificity often seems to
produce outcomes that reflect the power of self-interested private
groups, as, for example, where legislation reflects a capitulation of organizations using public-spirited rhetoric for their own parochial
ends.4 2 And delegations often stem not from a desire to evade ac39 See David P Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress; 1789-1791, 32
University of Chicago Occasional Working Papers (1994) (documenting close engagement with

constitutional issues in early legislative deliberations).
40 See the excellent treatment in Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos; and Governance: Using
PublicChoice to Improve Public Law 131-57 (Yale 1997).
41 This is not to deny that often delegation is in the electoral self-interest of legislators-a

matter of claiming the credit for initiating a solution to a problem but escaping political heat for
any controversial choice of approach, which will inevitably create losers. On the political dynamics of delegation, see Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L Rev at 30-34 (cited in
note 32); Epstein and O'Halloran, DelegatingPowers at 52-85 (cited in note 28).
42 See Bruce A. Ackerman and William T.Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir: or How the Clean
Air Act Became a Multibillion-DollarBail-outfor High-Sulfur Coal Producersand What Should
be Done about It (Yale 1981), for a classic discussion. See also Jonathan Adler, Clean Fuels Dirty
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countability but from a problem of lack of relevant information, 4 a

pervasive and far from illegitimate basis for delegation in law or even
life."
Indeed, there is no evidence that from any point of view, the nondelegation doctrine would make the operation of federal law better
rather than worse." There is no evidence that agencies operating pursuant to open-ended authority do better, on any dimension, than
agencies operating pursuant to statutes that sharply limit their discretion; nothing appears to link agency performance with statutory clarity.6 The view that the conventional doctrine would promote social
welfare is undermined not only by the pervasive risk of greater rentseeking, and greater interest-group power, via clear legislation. Statutory clarity, especially on details, is often a product not of some deliberative judgment by Congress, but of the influence of well organized
private groups.4 7 It is hard to come up with any a priori reason why decisions by agencies under vague language would be worse, from the
standpoint of promoting social well-being, than decisions by agencies
under more specific language from Congress.Q And in practice, respect
for regulatory agencies, and evidence that agencies do more good than
harm, cannot easily be connected to the narrowness of statutory delegations. 9 At the same time, judicial enforcement of the nondelegation
Air,in Michael S. Greve and Fred L. Smith, EnvironmentalPolitics:Public Costs,PrivateRewards
19 (Praeger 1992) (discussing interest group power in connection with the "clean fuels" debate).
43
See Epstein and O'Halloran, DelegatingPowers at 206-31 (cited in note 28).
44 See Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 Ethics
5,16 (1999).
45 See Mashaw, Greed, Chaos,.and Governance at 152-56 (cited in note 40).
46
See Stephen Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 65 (Aspen 4th ed
1999).
47 See Ackerman and Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir (cited in note 42).
48 See Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 65 (cited in note 46). In
his illuminating book, David Schoenbrod makes a somewhat different argument; he urges that
delegation reduces welfare because it allows Congress to "escape blame for both failing to
achieve [its] purpose and for imposing unnecessary costs." Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 9 (cited in note 3). It is true that a delegation can hide congressional responsibility for
imposing costs; this is a genuine problem with some delegations. But this point does not support
the proposition that a requirement of clear legislative guidance would systematically improve
social welfare. Undoubtedly such a requirement would prevent some misguided legislation and
regulation, but it would also produce some misguided legislation-see, for example, Ackerman
and Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air at 79-103 (cited in note 42) (discussing misguided pollutioncontrol proposals that resulted from congressional specificity on means)-and it would also prevent some desirable legislation and regulation (including deregulation).
I am not arguing that delegation is generally desirable from the standpoint of social welfare.
I am suggesting that from that standpoint, the case for preventing delegation is not proved, either in theory or empirically.
49
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service generally have strong reputations, even though they often act pursuant to open-ended grants
of authority; the Department of Agriculture has a weak reputation, even though much of the law
that it enforces is clear; and the Environmental Protection Agency is not thought to do better
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doctrine might well increase the opportunity for self-interested activity by well organized groups at the legislative level.!
It is highly speculative-an unacceptably crude generalizationto suggest that social welfare is, on any view of that contested ideal,
likely to be promoted by reducing the total volume of law. What precedes any new legislative enactment is always some body of law,
whether legislatively or judicially created; and why is there any reason
to think that the preceding law systematically promotes social welfare? Consider in this regard the conclusions of the most systematic
and detailed empirical analysis of the sources of delegations of
authority." The authors emphasize that the idea of wholesale delegation is a myth; in many areas, "some of which, like the budget and tax
policy, require considerable time and expertise-Congress takes a
major role in specifying the details of policy."52 Nor is Congress oblivious to executive performance. On the contrary, "legislators carefully
adjust and readjust discretion over time and across issue areas."53 Most
important for present purposes, the authors conclude that delegation
operates not as an alternative to congressionaljudgment, but instead
as a check on domination of lawmaking processes by legislative committees. In those committees, well organized groups can often dominate. Indeed, delegation is "a necessary counterbalance to the concentration of power in the hands of committees," or to the surrender of
"policy to a narrow subset of' members.4
In these circumstances, the authors conclude that limits on delegation "would threaten the very individual liberties they purport to
protect." A judicial effort to require greater legislative specificity
"would only push back into the halls of the legislature those issues on
which the committee system, with its lack of expertise and tendency
toward uncontrollable logrolls, produces policy most inefficientlyhardly a step in the right direction."55 In complex areas, a delegation
may well produce outcomes "close to those preferred by legislators"
and also their constituents-hardly an illegitimate result.S By contrast,
detailed policy guidance may produce a quite different, and worse, outcome, in which the regulator follows committee guidance that legislaunder narrow limitations on its own authority than under open-ended grants. See Ackerman and
Hassler, Clean CoalDirtyAir (cited in note 42), for a case study of unfortunate legislative specificity.
50 See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
Cardozo L Rev 775,792 (1999).
51 See Epstein and O'Halloran, DelegatingPowers (cited in note 28).
52 Id at 237.
53 Id.
54 Id.

55 Id at 238.
56 Id.
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tors as a whole would not have preferred. The authors conclude that
the various goals sought by defenders of the nondelegation doctrineless law, more legitimate law, less power from well organized private
groups, and more accountability-would not, in fact, be promoted by
the doctrine.n
Empirical investigations of this kind cannot resolve constitutional
issues. But if the conventional doctrine is defended on the ground that
its enforcement would produce certain desirable outcomes, surely it is
relevant if those outcomes are most unlikely to result in fact.2 At the
very least, the empirical doubts suggest that the defense of the doctrine has been unduly abstract, a matter of words rather than of evidence, even with respect to the most basic ideals of accountability and
legitimacy.
Finally, it is far from clear that the interest in "liberty" justifies
the conventional doctrine. Why should it be thought that any particular status quo, itself pervaded by law, embodies freedom, and that the
new law at issue would threaten to abridge freedom? It is far from
clear, for example, that the common law system for regulating water
pollution-itself a regulatory system-should be seen as an embodiment of liberty, and that a federal statute controlling water pollution is
a liberty-threatening abridgment of that freedom. Or is a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability, or sex, something that
threatens liberty, so that it is crucial to obtain legislative agreement
about the details, lest liberty be overridden? Or might the discriminatory status quo be the real threat to freedom? Questions of this kind
raise serious doubts about the idea that the conventional doctrine
would promote liberty, properly conceived. As we shall see, there are
contexts in which requirements of legislative specificity would indeed
operate as liberty-enhancing safeguards; but the conventional doctrine
is too broad and crude to be defensible on this ground.
3. Questions about judicial competence.
For the conventional doctrine, an especially serious problem
stems from problems of judicial competence. Under that doctrine, the
line between a permitted and a prohibited delegation is one of degree,
and inevitably so. The distinction between "executive" and "legislative" power cannot depend on anything qualitative; the issue is a
quantitative one. The real question is: How much executive discretion

57 Id at 239.
58 See Richard A. Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory 156-64, 182,217
(Harvard 1999) (suggesting the relevance of empirical issues to constitutional and administrative

law).
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is too much to count as "executive"? No metric is easily available to
answer that question.
In these circumstances, the overwhelming likelihood is that judicial enforcement of the doctrine would produce ad hoc, highly discretionary rulings, giving little guidance to lower courts or to Congress itself ' The matter is even worse than that. Because the underlying issue
is one of degree, decisions invalidating statutes as unduly open-ended
are likely to suffer from the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of judicial hostility to the particular program at issue. For this reason, those
concerned about rule-free law are especially likely to be uncomfortable with any large-scale revival of the conventional doctrine. ' OWithout much exaggeration, and with tongue only slightly in cheek, we
might even say that judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine
would violate the conventional doctrine-since it could not enforced
without delegating, without clear standards, a high degree of discretionary lawmaking authority to the judiciary. These points are all the
more troubling in light of the simple fact that judicial enforcement of
the conventional doctrine would grant massive new authority to the
federal judiciary, authority to second-guess legislative judgments
about how much discretion is too much, without clear constitutional
standards for answering that question."
It is highly revealing in this regard that Professor David Currie,
an evident enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine, concludes his
careful review of the uses of that doctrine by the German Constitutional Court with a candid statement of the unruly nature of the German cases, which seem to have a generated a high degree of confusion
and uncertainty.2 Professor Currie wonders whether we have not "lost
something significant that the Germans have worked hard to maintain," and he writes, with approval, of the fact that the German "Constitutional Court has devoted itself diligently to the task of assuring
that the major policy decisions respecting the content of the law are
made by the representative and popularly elected legislature, as they
should be in a republican democracy."3 But he also notes that the "decisions are numerous and not all easy to reconcile," and he empha59

See sources cited in note 23.
See Mistretta,488 US at 415-16 (Scalia dissenting). Justice Scalia's skepticism about the
conventional doctrine coexists comfortably with his general objection to rule-free doctrine. See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,1178 (1989).
61 See Schuck, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 790-91 (cited in note 50), concluding that the doctrine
is "a prescription for judicial supervision of both the substance and forms of legislation and
hence of politics and public policy, without the existence of even the possibility of any coherent,
principled, or manageable judicial standards." Id at 792-93.
62 See Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany at 133 (cited in note
29).
63 Id.
60
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sizes that they "document the difficulty and uncertainty of administering a requirement that is necessarily a matter of degree."' It would
not be unreasonable to take the German experience, showing a high
level of doctrinal confusion from a distinguished Court, as offering a
cautionary note about large-scale judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine, and as inspiring a search, in courts and otherwise, for
better alternatives.
C. Tentative Conclusions
All this does not demonstrate that the conventional nondelegation doctrine deserves no place in federal law. In the most extreme
cases, judicial invalidation is appropriate; none of the points made
here is inconsistent with the view that Schechter Poultry was rightly
decided. It also seems sensible for courts to construe ambiguous statutes so as to grant less, rather than more, discretionary authority to
administrative agencies.6 But two serious problems have emerged
with large-scale judicial use of the conventional doctrine. The first involves the considerable difficulty of principled judicial enforcement.
The second involves the absence of reason to believe that the conventional doctrine would be more good than harm for modern government.6
For those who believe that these problems are not insurmountable, and that the conventional doctrine deserves to be revived, it
might nonetheless be desirable to search for alternatives, operating as
complements rather than as substitutes. And for those who believe, as
I do, that the problems are not in fact surmountable, it becomes all the
more important to isolate approaches that serve the legitimate purposes of the conventional doctrine without risking law-free judicial
enforcement and without endangering the operation of modern government. The most important uses of nondelegation concerns come
not through invalidation of federal statutes but through the nondelegation canons-the real place where the nondelegation doctrine
flourishes, as we shall now see.

64

Id.

See Gellhorn, 36 Am U L Rev at 352 (cited in note 22).
See Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegated Powers (cited in note 28). In the same vein see
the careful discussion in Schuck, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 776 (cited in note 50), and in particular
Schuck's conclusion that "the ubiquity of broad delegations denotes much more than the undoubted desires of politicians to eat their cake and have it too. In my view, delegation-when
backed (as it is in our system) by many powerful institutional and informal controls over agency
discretion- constitutes one of the most salutary developments in the long struggle to instantiate
the often competing values of democratic participation, political accountability, legal regularity,
and administrative effectiveness." Id.
65
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II. HIDDEN NONDELEGATION PRINCIPLES
Let us turn now to a question that bears directly on the current
status of the nondelegation doctrine: What is the authority of administrative agencies to interpret the law? When Congress has spoken
clearly, everyone agrees that agencies are bound by what Congress has
said. The disputed question has to do with the authority of agencies to
act when Congress has not spoken clearly. Of course a very strong version of the nondelegation doctrine would suggest that agencies can, in

such cases, do nothing, because the underlying grant of power is effectively void. But short of this radical conclusion, what is the allocation
of authority to agencies?
A.

Chevron as Canon: Aggravating the Delegation Problem?

The place to start is of course Chevron USA v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc,67 the decision that dominates modern administrative law.6' There the Supreme Court held that unless Congress has
decided the "precise question at issue," agencies are authorized to interpret ambiguous terms as they see fit, so long as the interpretation is
reasonable.6' Chevron creates a familiar two-step inquiry. The first
question is whether Congress has directly decided the precise question
at issue. The second question is whether the agency interpretation is
reasonable.70 Indeed, Chevron establishes a novel canon of construction:7 ' In the face of ambiguity, statutes mean what the relevant agency
takes them to mean.
This is an emphatically prodelegation canon, indeed it is the quintessential prodelegation canon, and some critics have suggested that
Chevron is highly objectionable precisely on nondelegation grounds.7
On this view, the problem is that under Chevron, agencies are not
merely given authority that is often open-ended; they are also permitted to interpret the scope of their own authority, at least in the face of
ambiguity. A regime in which agencies lacked this authority wouldit might be claimed-fit better with nondelegation principles, for
under such a regime, agencies would lack the power to construe
statutory terms on their own. On this view, the key point, explicitly
467 US 837 (1984).
The literature is immense. For an overview, see Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and
Regulatory Policy at 334-44 (cited in note 46).
69 467 US at 842-43.
70 Id.
71 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke LJ 511.
72 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452,511-26 (1989).
67

68

73

See id.
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recognized in the case and by its most enthusiastic defenders, is that
Chevron holds that statutory ambiguities are implicit delegations of
interpretive (realistically, lawmaking) authority to agencies."' The opposing view-that ambiguities are not delegations at all-would fit
better with the constitutional structure.
The weakness of this objection stems from the fact that when
statutory terms are ambiguous, there is no escaping delegation. Neither Chevron nor anti-Chevron prevents delegation. By hypothesis
Congress has not been clear, perhaps because it has been unable to resolve the issue, perhaps because it did not foresee it. The recipient of
the delegation will be either agencies or courts. If Chevron is rejected,
ambiguous terms will be construed by judges rather than administrators, and in neither event will hard questions be decided legislatively.
Chevron does increase the discretionary authority of agencies-this is
the sense in which it creates a prodelegation canon-but only in relation to courts. With respect to the nondelegation question itself, it is
neither here nor there.
B. Trumping Chevron:ThreeCategories of Nondelegation Canons
It is plain, however, that a variety of canons of constructionwhat I am calling nondelegation canons-trump Chevron itself.7 In
other words, the agency's interpretation of law does not, under current
doctrine, prevail, if one of the nondelegation canons is at work. These
canons impose important constraints on administrative authority, for
agencies are not permitted to understand ambiguous provisions to
give them authority to venture in certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary. The nondelegation canons fall in three
principal categories. Some are inspired by the Constitution; others involve issues of sovereignty; still others have their foundations in public
policy.
An important qualification: I do not mean to endorse each of the
canons here. The goal at this stage is descriptive, not normative-to
see how the nondelegation canons operate as a constraint on administrative power. It does not matter if particular canons would turn out,
on reflection, to be indefensible.
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467 US at 842-45. See also Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 519-20 (cited in note 71).
See, for example, Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital,488 US 204,208-09,212-13

(1988) (noting a canon against interpreting a statute to be retroactive and denying judicial deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute when the agency itself has articulated no
position on the question). This is the tendency of current law with respect to all of the nondelegation canons discussed here, but the tendency is, in some cases, little more than that, and on the
conflict of the canons with Chevron, there are some conflicts in the lower courts. See, for example, Peter S. Heinecke, Comment, Chevron and the Canon FavoringIndians,60 U Chi L Rev 1015
(1993). I do not discuss these conflicts here.
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1. Constitutionally inspired nondelegation canons.
A number of nondelegation canons have constitutional origins.
They are designed to promote some goal with a constitutional foundation. Consider, as the most familiar example, the (controversial") idea
that agencies will not be permitted to construe statutes in such a way
as to raise serious constitutional doubts.7 Notice that this principle
goes well beyond the (uncontroversial) notion that agencies should
not be allowed to construe statutes so as to be unconstitutional. The
principle appears to say that constitutionally sensitive questions (for
example, whether a statute would intrude on the right to travel, violate
the right to free speech, or constitute a taking) will not be permitted to
arise unless the constitutionally designated lawmaker has deliberately
and expressly chosen to raise them. The only limitations on the principle are that the constitutional doubts must be serious and substantial,
and that the statute must be fairly capable of an interpretation contrary to the agency's own' 8 So long as the statute is unclear, and the
constitutional question serious, Congress must decide to raise that
question via explicit statement. This idea trumps Chevron for that very
reason. Executive interpretation of a vague statute is not enough
when the purpose of the canon is to require Congress to make its instructions clear.
Belonging in the same category is the idea that administrative
agencies will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous provisions so as to
preempt state law. 9 The constitutional source of this principle is the
evident constitutional commitment to a federal structure, a commitment that may not be compromised without a congressional decision
to do so-an important requirement in light of the various safeguards
against cavalier disregard of state interests created by the system of
state representation in Congress.nO Notice that there is no constitutional obstacle to national preemption; Congress is entitled to preempt state law if it chooses. But there is a constitutional obstacle of a
sort: the preemption decision must be made legislatively, not bureaucratically.'
76
77
78
79

Richard A. Posner, The FederalCourts: Crisisand Reform 285 (Harvard 1985).
See note 7.
See Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173,191 (1991).
See NationalAssociation of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v FCC,880 F2d 422 (DC

Cir 1989).
80 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 Colum L Rev 543
(1954), for the classic discussion of these safeguards. A recent treatment is Larry Kramer, Putting
the PoliticsBack in the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism,100 Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2000).
81 It is not entirely clear whether an agency might be able to decide the question if Congress expressly said that the agency is permitted to do so. This raises a general point about the
nondelegation canons: What would happen if Congress attempted to bypass them by a clear
statement of delegation? I take up this question in Section II.B.4 below.
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As a third example, consider the notion that unless Congress has
spoken with clarity, agencies are not allowed to apply statutes retroactively, even if the relevant terms are quite unclear.n Because retroactivity is disfavored in the law, Congress will not be taken to have
delegated to administrative agencies the authority to decide the question. The best way to understand this idea is as an institutional echo of
the notion that the Due Process Clause forbids retroactive application
of law.8 Of course the constitutional constraints on retroactivity are
now modest; while the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactive application of the criminal law, the clause is narrowly construed, and Congress is generally permitted to impose civil legislation retroactively if
it chooses.n But there is an institutional requirement here. Congress
must make that choice explicitly and take the political heat for deciding to do so. It will not be taken to have attempted the same result via
delegation, and regulatory agencies will not be taken to have the
authority to choose retroactivity on their own. Perhaps part of the
courts' motivation here is ambivalence about judicial refusal to apply
the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the Due Process Clause, so as to call into
constitutional question some retroactive applications of civil law. The
nondelegation canon is a more cautious way of promoting the relevant concerns.
Consider, finally, the rule of lenity, which says that in the face of
ambiguity, criminal statutes will be construed favorably to criminal defendants. One function of the lenity principle is to ensure against delegations. Criminal law must be a product of a clear judgment on Congress's part. Where no clear judgment has been made, the statute will
not apply merely because it is plausibly interpreted, by courts or enforcement authorities, to fit the case at hand. The rule of lenity is inspired by the due process constraint on conviction pursuant to openended or vague statutes. While it is not itself a constitutional mandate,
it is rooted in a constitutional principle, and serves as a time-honored
nondelegation canon.
2. Sovereignty-inspired nondelegation canons.
The second category of nondelegation canons contains principles
that lack a constitutional source but that have a foundation in wide82 Bowen v Georgetofvn University Hospital,488 US 204,208 (1988).
83 Id.
84 The notion is defended in Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power

of Eminent Domain255-59 (Harvard 1985).
85 See, for example, Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining, 438 US 1,14-20 (1976) (holding that
the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 does not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

by requiring employers to provide retrospective compensation for former employees' death or
disability due to employment in mines).
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spread understandings about the nature of governmental authoritymore particularly, in widespread understandings about sovereignty.
Consider here the fact that agencies are not permitted to apply statutes outside of the territorial borders of the United States.6 If statutes
are to receive extraterritorial application, it must be as a result of a
deliberate congressional judgment to this effect. The central notion
here is that extraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive
judgments involving international relations; such judgments must be
made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in which the President of
course
participates). The executive may not make this decision on its
87
own.
For broadly related reasons, agencies cannot interpret statutes
and treaties unfavorably to Native Americans.' Where statutory provisions are ambiguous, the government will not prevail. This idea is
plainly an outgrowth of the complex history of relations between the
United States and Native American tribes, which have semi-sovereign
status; it is an effort to ensure that any unfavorable outcome will be a
product of an explicit judgment from the national legislature. The institutional checks created by congressional structure must be navigated before an adverse decision may be made. Consider, as a final if
more controversial illustration, the fact that agencies are not permitted to waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, and indeed
statutory ambiguity cannot be used by agencies as a basis for waiver,
which must be explicit in legislation.9 Sovereign immunity is a background structural understanding, defeasible only on the basis of a
judgment to that effect by the national legislature.

86
87

EEOC v ArabianAmerican Oil Co, 499 US 244,248 (1991).
Of course the executive is permitted to make a large number of quite sensitive decisions

involving foreign relations, partly because of express constitutional commitments, partly because
of perceived contemporary necessities. And it would not be impossible to imagine a legal system
in which the executive was permitted, in the event of ambiguity, to resolve the issue of extraterri-

toriality. Recall that my goal here is descriptive, not normative. The best defense of this particular
nondelegation canon would be that the question whether the enacted law should be applied outside of the nation's borders is a large and essentially legislative one, which cannot be made by
the executive on its own.
88 See Ramah Navajo Chapterv Lujan, 112 F3d 1455,1461-62 (10th Cir 1997) (grounding a
canon of statutory construction favoring Native Americans in "the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians"); Williams v Babbitt,115 F2d 657, 660 (9th Cir 1997)
(noting in dicta that courts "are required to construe statutes favoring Native Americans liber-

ally in their favor"); Tyonek Native Corp v Secretary ofInterior,836 F2d 1237,1239 (9th Cir 1988)
(noting in dicta that "statutes benefiting Native Americans should be construed liberally in their
favor").
89

United States Departmentof Energy v Ohio, 503 US 607,615 (1992).
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3. Nondelegation canons inspired by perceived public policy.
The final set of nondelegation canons is designed to implement
perceived public policy, by, among other things, giving sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt-and by requiring Congress itself to
speak if it wants to compromise policy that is perceived as generally
held. The most sympathetic understanding of these canons rests on the

view that the relevant policies are not the judges' own, but have a
source in widely held social commitments.
There are many examples. Exemptions from taxation are nar-

rowly construed;n if Congress wants to exempt a group from federal
income tax, it must express its will clearly. A central idea here may be
that such exemptions are often the product of lobbying efforts by well
organized private groups, and thus a reflection of factional influence;
hence agencies may not create such exemptions on their own. At the
same time, there is a general federal policy against anticompetitive
practices, and agencies will not be permitted to seize on ambiguous
statutory language so as to defeat that policy.9' If Congress wants to

make an exception to the policy in favor of competition, it is certainly
permitted to do so. But agencies may not do so without congressional
instruction. So too, it is presumed that statutes providing veterans'
benefits will be construed generously for veterans, and agencies cannot conclude otherwise.9 This idea is an analogue to the notion that
statutes will be construed favorably to Native Americans; both require
a congressional judgment if a group perceived as weak or deserving is
going to be treated harshly.
In decisions of particular importance for the modem regulatory
state, agencies are sometimes forbidden to require very large expenditures for trivial or de minimis gains.n If Congress wants to be "abso90 United States v Wells Fargo Bank, 485 US 351,354 (1988).
91 Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v Thornburgh,868 F2d 1285,1299 (DC Cir
1989) (Ginsburg dissenting) (noting the "accepted rule" that antitrust exemptions must be narrowly construed); Group Life & Health Insurance v Royal Drug Co, 440 US 205, 231 (1979)
(noting the "well settled" rule that antitrust exceptions "are to be narrowly construed").
9
King v St. Vincent's Hospital,502 US 215,220 n 9 (1991).
93
See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607,
644 (1980) (plurality) (holding that in promulgating OSHA, Congress "intended, at a bare minimum, that the Secretary [of Labor] find a significant risk of harm and therefore a probability of
significant benefits before establishing a new standard"); Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947
F2d 1201,1222-23 (5th Cir 1991) (vacating the EPA's proposed rulemaking under the Toxic Substances Control Act and its ban on asbestos, partially on the grounds that the agency's own figures suggested that enforcing the regulation might cost as much as $74 million per life saved);
Alabama Power Co v Costle, 636 F2d 323,360-61 (DC Cir 1979) (stating that "[u]nless Congress
has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to
provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value"); Monsanto Co v Kennedy, 613 F2d 947, 954-55 (DC Cir 1979) (allowing the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs not to apply the strictly literal terms of the statute and to make de minimis exceptions).
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lutist" about safety, it is permitted to do so by explicit statement.9 But
agencies will not be allowed to take ambiguous language in this direction. This is a genuinely novel nondelegation principle, a creation of
the late twentieth century. It is an evident response to perceived
problems in modem regulatory policy.95
4. Barriers, catalysts, and minimalism.
How intrusive are the nondelegation canons? What kind of judicial role do they contemplate? Consider the view that these canons
are best understood not as barriers but as catalysts, allowing government to act so long as it does so through certain channels. The effort is
to trigger democratic (in the sense of legislative) processes and to ensure the forms of deliberation, and bargaining, that are likely to occur
in the proper arenas.
In a sense this understanding-of nondelegation canons as catalysts-is correct. So long as government is permitted to act when Congress has spoken clearly, no judicial barrier is in place.9 In this way, the
nondelegation canons are properly understood as a species of judicial
minimalism, indeed democracy-forcing minimalism, designed to ensure that judgments are made by the democratically preferable institution.7 As compared with more rigid barriers to government action, the
conventional nondelegation doctrine itself is a form of minimalism insofar as it requires Congress to speak with clarity and does not disable
the government entirely. And because the nondelegation canons are
narrower and more specifically targeted-requiring particular rather
than general legislative clarity-they are more minimalist still.
But this understanding misses an important point. Nondelegation
canons are barriers, and not merely catalysts, with respect to purely
administrative (or executive) judgment on the matters in question.

94 See Public Citizen v Young, 831 F2d 1108, 1122 (DC Cir 1987) (finding no de minimis
exception under the Delaney Clause, which barred the use of carcinogens in food additives). In a
famous essay, Karl Llewellyn contended that the canons of construction were indeterminate and
unhelpful. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about how Statutes Are To Be Construed,3 Vand L Rev 395 (1950). There has been a
vigorous debate over whether Llewellyn was right. See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation26-27 (Princeton 1997) (Amy Guttman, ed) (rejecting Llewellyn's claim). Even if

Llewellyn is right, his argument does not undermine the nondelegation canons, which go in a single direction: against agency discretion. Of course it will be possible that other canons, for example those involving syntax, will support the agency's view of the statute.
95 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 10-17 (Harvard 1993) (discussing the

problem of "the last 10%").
96 Consider Hampton v Mow Sun Wong, 426 US 88, 114-17 (1976) (holding that the Civil
Service Commission could not decide to exclude aliens from the civil service, but leaving open
the question whether Congress or the President could do so).
97 On minimalism generally, see Sunstein, One CaseAt A 7me (cited in note 10).
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They erect a decisive barrier to certain discretionary decisions by the
executive. In this respect, at least, the relevant institutions are blocked.
This point raises a final issue, involving the status of the nondelegation canons: Suppose that Congress expressly delegates to administrative agencies the authority to decide (for example) whether a statute may be applied outside the territory of the United States, or
whether a statute should be construed favorably to Native Americans,
or whether a statute ought to be understood to raise a serious constitutional question. Would such a delegation be unconstitutional? No
clear authority answers this question, for Congress has never attempted to do anything of this sort. But at first glance, a delegation of
this kind would not seem by itself to violate the conventional nondelegation doctrine, as currently understood, so long as Congress has
not given the agency a general "blank check," which courts are loathe
to find.n Thus the answer appears to be that the nondelegation canons
are merely tools of construction, and that they should not be taken to
forbid Congress from delegating expressly if it chooses.
On the other hand, the Court suggested otherwise in the only decision that at all bears on this question. In Hampton v Mow Sun
Wong, the Supreme Court invoked the Due Process Clause to strike
down a Civil Service Commission regulation banning aliens from
working for the United States Civil Service.n The Court emphasized
that any such ban must be defended by reference to serious national
interests, and it acknowledged that the rule might be valid if issued by
the President or Congress. And some relevant interests-such as encouraging naturalization or giving the President a bargaining chip in
negotiations with foreign countries-might be sufficient if invoked by
the President or Congressln Here, however, neither Congress nor the
President required the ban; they had merely acquiesced in it. ' The
Court refused to interpret the apparently open-ended statute-allowing the President and his delegate the Commission to "prescribe
M
T

such regulations ... as will best promote the efficiency of' the civil

service'-to permit the Civil Service Commission to take account of
the goal of encouraging naturalization or granting a bargaining chip to
the President. Those interests were beyond the Commission's domain' 5 (even though they might be invoked by the President under the
98 See note 16 and accompanying text.
99 426 US 88 (1976).
100 Id at 114-17.
101 Id at 116.
102 Id at 105.
103 Id.
104

5 USC § 3301(1) (1994).

105 Mow Sun Wong, 426 US at 115.
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same statutory provision). The Commission could invoke the interest
in having "one simple rule," ° but that interest was too "hypothetical"
to justify "the wholesale deprivation" here.'°
To say the least, Mow Sun Wong is an opaque opinion. It is clear
that, in the Court's view, a decision to ban noncitizens from the civil
service must be made by Congress or the President; it cannot be made
by agencies alone. The narrowest reading of the opinion is that the
Court will not interpret an ambiguous statutory provision to allow an
agency to reach a constitutionally questionable decision on a subject
outside its expertise. But Mow Sun Wong is a due process holding, not
a mere matter of statutory interpretation, and it is plausible to take
the case to stand for the proposition that under the Due Process
Clause, and as a matter of constitutionally required "procedures,"' '
Congress or the President, not agencies alone, are required to make
decisions affecting certain constitutionally sensitive rights and interests.
The Mow Sun Wong decision has had no progeny,109 and outside
0 the Court would be most unlikely to
of very unusual circumstances,""
say that Congress cannot delegate to agencies the power of decision,
even in sensitive areas, if it chooses to do so expressly. But notice that
Congress must take the political heat that would undoubtedly be generated by any such explicit delegation, a point that helps account for
Congress's failure to delegate authority of that kind. And notice too
that in cases in which a constitutional right is plausibly at stake, the
Court might invoke Mow Sun Wong and strike down the delegation
on due process grounds.
III. CANONS RECONCEIVED AND REDEEMED

A. Judicial Administrability and Congressional Lawmaking
Canons of the sort I have outlined here are highly controversial.
Judge Posner, for example, fears that some of them create a "penumbral Constitution," authorizing judges to bend statutes in particular
directions even though there may in fact be no constitutional viola106

Id.

107 Id at 115-16.
108 Id at 103.
109 An important qualification is that Justice Powel relied on the case in his extremely important opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Regents of the University of California

v Bakke, 438 US 265,309 (1978); Justice Powell emphasized that the affirmative action program
at issue there had not been adopted by the California legislature, and was the product of a deci-

sion of university administration, a body with far less of a democratic pedigree. Justice Powell
thus announced a kind of nondelegation canon with respect to certain affirmative action pro-

grams.
110 Mow Sun Wong itself involved such circumstances: a wholesale exclusion of noncitizens

from a huge class of jobs. See 426 US at 92-93.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:315

tion.' But if the analysis here is correct, there is a simple answer to
these concerns: The relevant canons operate as nondelegation principles, and they are designed to ensure that Congress decides certain
contested questions on its own. If this idea is a core structural commitment of the Constitution, there can be no problem with its judicial
enforcement.
We can go further. As noted above, there are serious problems
with judicial enforcement of the conventional nondelegation doctrine.' 12 The difficulty of drawing lines between prohibited and permitted delegations makes it reasonable to conclude that for the most
part, the ban on unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced
norm, and properly so. From the standpoint of improving the operation of the regulatory state, it is also far from clear that general judicial enforcement of the doctrine would do much good; for reasons
given above, it might even produce considerable harm.
Compare, along the relevant dimensions, judicial use of the nondelegation canons. Here the institutional problem is far less severe.
Courts do not ask the hard-to-manage question whether the legislature has exceeded the permissible level of discretion, but pose instead
the far more manageable question whether the agency has been given
the discretion to decide something that (under the appropriate canon)
only legislatures may decide. In other words, courts ask a question
about subject matter, not a question about degree.
Putting the competence of courts to one side, the nondelegation
canons have the salutary function of ensuring that certain important
rights and interests will not be compromised unless Congress has expressly decided to compromise them. Thus the nondelegation canons
lack a central defect of the conventional doctrine: While there is no
good reason to think that a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine
would improve the operation of modern regulation, it is entirely reasonable to think that for certain kinds of decisions, merely executive
decisions are not enough.
If, for example, an agency is attempting on its own to apply domestic law extraterritorially, we might believe that whatever its expertise, it is inappropriate, as a matter of democratic theory and international relations, for this to happen unless Congress has decided that it
should. Or courts might reasonably believe that retroactive application of regulatory law is acceptable not simply because the executive
111 See Posner, FederalCourtsat 285 (cited in note 76).
112 See note 34 and accompanying text.
113 Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1213-28 (1978) (distinguishing, particularly in cases of judicial selfrestraint, between the scope of constitutional norms and the scope of judicial enforcement of

constitutional norms).
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believes that an ambiguous law should be so construed, but if and only
if Congress has reached this conclusion. This judgment might be
founded on the idea that political safeguards will ensure that Congress
will so decide only if there is very good reason for that decision. For
those who believe that retroactivity is constitutionally unacceptable,
this may be insufficient consolation. But a requirement that Congress
make the decision on its own is certainly likely to make abuses less
common, if they are legitimately characterized as abuses at all. Many
of the canons discussed above fall within my basic account, stressing
the role of nondelegation canons in ensuring that certain rights and interests will not be compromised without explicit congressional instructions. Above all, perhaps, this is true for the idea that agencies may not
raise serious constitutional questions on their own.
These points have the considerable advantage of understanding
the nondelegation canons as a modem incarnation of the framers' basic project of linking individual rights and interests with institutional
design.'14 The link comes from protecting certain rights and interests
not through a flat judicial ban on governmental action, but through a
requirement that certain controversial or unusual actions will occur
only with respect for the institutional safeguards introduced through
the design of Congress. There is thus a close connection between the
nondelegation canons and a central aspiration of the constitutional
structure.
It would be possible to object at this point that the nondelegation
canons will, in practice, operate as more than presumptions. At least in
most cases, congressional inertia, and multiple demands on Congress's
time, will mean that the result ordained by the canon will prevail for
the foreseeable future. If this is the case, nondelegation canons will not
"force" legislative deliberation but simply produce a (judicially preferred?) result. But there are three problems with this objection. First,
Congress will sometimes respond to the judicial decision by legislating
with clarity; this has happened many times in the past.' 5 Second, the
nondelegation canons-to deserve support-must rest on something
other than judicial policy preferences; they must have some foundation in concerns, institutional or otherwise, of the sort identified above.
Third, there is nothing to lament about a situation in which, for example, statutes may not be applied retroactively, or extraterritorially,
without congressional authorization, and in which Congress is unable
to muster the will to give that authorization. If the argument here is
correct, the outcome ordained by the nondelegation canon should

114

See Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason at 6-28 (cited in note 11).

115 For a catalogue, see William Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,101 Yale L J 331,424-41 (1991).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:315

prevail unless Congress has said otherwise. The fact that sometimes
Congress will not say otherwise is not an argument against the canon;

it is a tribute to it.
B.

Qualifications and Futures

There are some important limitations to the argument thus far.
Of course many canons, including those here, operate even when
agencies are not involved.116 Nothing I have said operates as a defense

of canons except insofar as they serve as checks on agency authority. It
would be necessary to look elsewhere to justify canons that do not involve an exercise of discretion by administrative agencies. If we lean
very hard on the idea that some constitutional norms are underen-

forced by courts, we might be able to begin such a justification;'17 but
that is a different topic.
Nor have I suggested that the nondelegation canons accomplish
precisely the same goals as the old nondelegation doctrine, or for that
matter vice versa. There are several differences. For its defenders, the

nondelegation doctrine is supposed to operate as a general or global
requirement that Congress make the basic judgments of value.1 8 The
nondelegation canons have a conspicuously more limited office. Consider, for example, the authority of the Federal Communications
Commission to give out broadcasting licenses in accordance with
"public convenience, interest, or necessity. 1 9 Those who are enthusiastic about the nondelegation doctrine would want to invalidate this

authority altogether. By contrast, a nondelegation canon would oper116 See, for example, Wisconsin Department of Revenue v William Wrigley, Jr., Co, 505 US
214,231 (1992) (rejecting Wisconsin's argument that the canon of de minimis exceptions did not
apply to 15 USC § 381, which immunizes a corporation from state taxes under certain circumstances); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452,470 (1991) (holding that Missouri's mandatory retirement age for judges does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, because "in the face of ambiguity" the Court will "not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on
state governmental functions"); Hoffman v Connecticut Departmentof Income Maintenance,492
US 96, 101 (1989) (noting that Congress cannot abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court without clearly stating its intentions in the statutory language);
California v ARC America Corp, 490 US 93, 101 (1989) (noting the historic presumption that
federal acts cannot supersede state police powers unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress); Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc v Brock, 483 US 27, 35 (1987) (following the Court's
traditional approach of refusing to make tacit or implicit exemptions to enforcement of the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
117 The basic idea is that courts underenforce some norms because of the judiciary's lack of
fact-finding competence and electoral legitimacy. On the general idea, see Sager, 91 Harv L Rev
at 1213-28 (cited in note 113). On the connection of judicially underenforced constitutional
norms to canons of construction, see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron,
90 Colum L Rev 2071,2105-19 (1990).
118See Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (cited in note 3); Ely, Democracy and
Distrust at 131-34 (cited in note 1).
119 47 USC § 307(a) (1994).
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ate to forbid the FCC from exercising its authority in such a way as to
create serious First Amendment questions, by, for example, requiring
broadcasters to provide free air time for candidates for public office.'n

A ruling to this effect limits FCC discretion, but only in a narrow, targeted way. Certainly a world of nondelegation canons would impose
far fewer and weaker constraints on FCC authority than a world in
which the nondelegation doctrine were vigorously enforced. Thus
those who believe in that doctrine and urge its revival would undoubtedly conclude that the nondelegation canons achieve far too little. My basic response to this objection is that even for those who believe the nondelegation doctrine is great, the nondelegation canons
are good. In any case I have offered reasons to believe that the nondelegation doctrine is far from great; the nondelegation canons seem
to me far preferable, because they are easily administrable, impose a
much less serious strain on judicial capacities, and promise to do more
good while also producing less harm.
We have seen that many people are skeptical of the conventional
nondelegation doctrine, and for good reasons.' Ought they also to be
skeptical of nondelegation canons? Do the objections to the conventional doctrine apply to the contemporary one? Part of the answer
depends on the particular canons in question. But insofar as the concern involves judicial competence, the nondelegation canons are far
less troublesome, simply because they do not require judges to resolve
a hard issue about degree (how much discretion is too much discretion?) and allow judges instead to draw clear lines (for example, if the
statute is ambiguous, it may not be applied extraterritorially). Nor do
the nondelegation canons create serious risks to the operation of the
regulatory state. Their narrower office is to ensure congressional deliberation on issues of great sensitivity. Nothing in the nondelegation
canons runs afoul of the reasonable concerns of those who are skeptical about the conventional doctrine.
The most important future debates will involve not the existence
or legitimacy of nondelegation canons, but their particular content. Of
course the category changes over time. As noted, a core nondelegation
canon of the early twentieth century required a clear legislative
statement to authorize an interference with common law rights. For
the most part, this canon is no longer reflected in current law. By contrast, the idea that statutes will be construed so as to require de minimis exceptions is relatively new, a creation of the late twentieth century, a self-conscious judicial response to certain problems in regula120 Compare Syracuse Peace Council v FCC, 867 F2d 654, 669 (DC Cir 1989) (upholding

FCC abandonment of the fairness doctrine).
121 See, for example, Mashaw, Greed, Chaos; and Governance at 142-48 (cited in note 40);
Stewart, 36 Am U L Rev at 324-28 (cited in note 34).
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tory law. It would be easy to imagine the introduction of new canons
and the repudiation of current ones. I have attempted to sketch defenses of existing nondelegation canons, in order to understand the
basis for the view that the relevant issues may not be resolved bureaucratically. But nothing in the general account depends on whether any
particular canons are defensible.
A distinctive objection to the nondelegation canons, as catalogued here, is that they are numerous and potentially unruly, and in
that way threaten to produce a complex legal system, one that imposes
costs on litigants and those seeking to know the context of the law. By
contrast, a simple version of the Chevron principle, allowing agencies
to interpret ambiguous provisions, promises to hold down decision
costs and also to promote planning, in the sense that people will know
that where there is ambiguity, the agency will prevail. As a general
rule, this is an important point about any system of multiple "canons,"
and it may argue in favor of greater simplicity, and more clarity, than
current law provides. In practice, however, the existing system of nondelegation canons does not leave a great deal of uncertainty, except
perhaps in the decision (inevitably complex in some cases) whether
the statute at issue is ambiguous. In contemporary administrative law,
the real lack of clarity comes not from nondelegation canons, but from
general uncertainty about Chevron itselt which different courts, and
panels, apply with noticeably different degrees of enthusiasm.
CONCLUSION

In this Article I have argued that the nondelegation canons
amount to a distinctive, unified, and quite important feature of modern public law. The function of these canons-the modem nondelegation doctrine-is to ban Congress from authorizing administrative' =
agencies, or the executive branch, from making certain decisions.
These canons do not merely operate as nondelegation principles; they
are the thing itself. They show that the nondelegation doctrine is alive
and well. It has merely been relocated and left unnamed.
My principal point has been descriptive-to help in understanding and unifying a set of outcomes that might otherwise seem puzzling
or even incoherent. But there are normative points as well. The nondelegation canons have important advantages over the conventional
nondelegation doctrine insofar as they impose fewer strains on judicial capacities and do not threaten, as the conventional doctrine
would, to harm rather than improve the operation of the regulatory
state. As a class, the nondelegation canons are best defended on the
122 As noted above, it is unclear whether the ban is constitutional in status or whether it is
merely presumptive, a tool of construction. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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ground that certain decisions are ordinarily expected to be made by
the national legislature, with its various institutional safeguards, and
not via the executive alone.'2 In this way the nondelegation canons
take their place as one of the most prominent domains in which protection of individual rights, and of other important interests, occurs not
through blanket prohibitions on governmental action, but through
channeling decisions to particular governmental institutions, in this
case Congress itself."'

123 Compare the closely related decision of the Supreme Court of Israel to bar the practice
of torture, at least unless and until the national legislature has authorized the security forces to
engage in that practice. See Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel, HC 5100/94 at
1 39 (1999), available online at <http://www.court.gov.il/mishpatthtml/en/verdict/judgment.rtf>
(visited Feb 14,2000).
124 Compare this idea with the understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as triggering
political safeguards through the requirement of generality. See Scalia, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1178
(cited in note 60); Railway Express Agency, Inc v New York, 336 US 106,112-13 (1949) (Jackson
concurring).

